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Abstract 
 
Regulatory frameworks are a key institutional instrument for governance of change in socio-
technical systems. One of the main problems in the extant literature on the role of regulation 
in innovation systems is that it assumes a static framework, often overlooking the dynamic 
relationship between innovation and regulation. In this chapter we show the dynamic 
interaction between US regulation in medical devices and the technological evolution of a 
surgical implant, the hip prosthesis, first introduced in the market in the early 1970s’. We 
suggest that the burdensome regulatory requirements imposed on the deployment of radical 
innovations in medical devices have led to the exhaustion of the search path for safe 
incremental innovations: as hip prosthesis have entered the mature stages of their 
technological evolutions, incremental improvements have become riskier and have ultimately 
failed. 
Keywords 
Governance, medical devices, incremental innovation, innovation patterns.  
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1. Introduction. 
Any process of technical change carries with it an element of uncertainty: market 
responses are unpredictable, technologies may not work as expected and they may have 
unforeseen consequences. Such uncertainty occurs both when changes relate to a 
specific technology operating within a given innovation or socio-technical system, or 
when the changes are more profound and affect the whole system. Managing such 
uncertainty becomes one of the functions of a governance system, and in particular of 
the governance of processes of technological change. One of the instruments of such 
systems of governance is the development and implementation of regulatory 
frameworks. By focusing on regulatory framewoks, this paper focuses on one of the 
four pillars of the analysis of the governance of change in innovation systems identified 
by Borrás and Edler (2012): the “instrumentation of the governance of change”. We see 
regulation as a form of governance instrument, shaping the ways in which actors 
involved in the innovation process develop, implement and use innovations. We 
understand regulatory frameworks as arrangements of “legally binding formal 
regulations which constrain and regulate interaction” in innovation systems (Borrás and 
Edler, 2012). In other words, regulatory frameworks affect the way in which actors 
involved in innovation processes coordinate their activities, they “guide the search” of 
innovations systems (Hekkert et al. 2007),
1
 and shape the direction of technological 
change and the evolution of innovation systems.  
One of the main problems in the extant studies of the role of regulatory frameworks in 
innovation systems is that they typically assume a static framework (Kemp, 1998; 
Blind, 2004, 2010), overlooking the dynamic nature of the interaction between 
regulation and innovation
2
. Hekkert et al. (2007) argued that this dynamic deficit is 
shared by the broader research on innovation systems: the analysis of the structural 
complexity of national, regional, sectorial or large-technological systems levels leaves 
little space for the detailed account of dynamic change. “Even though [the innovation 
system] framework is based on theories such as interactive learning and evolutionary 
                                                          
1
 An example of “guide of search” function in innovation systems is environmental regulation, which sets 
the goals of many fields of industrial innovation (Blind, 2010). Regulation performs this function 
together with other institutional structures derived from softer norms or values (Bergek et al., 2008).  
2
 Until now, the literature on the relationship between regulation and innovation has mostly stressed 
the impact of regulation on innovation intensity, measured typically through R&D expenditure and 
patent counts (Vernon, 2005; Gerard and Lave, 2005; Golec and Vernon, 2010). 
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economics, most analyses of innovation systems are quasi-static in character. There is a 
focus on comparing the social structure of different innovation systems (actors, their 
relations, and institutions) and, thereby, explaining the differences in performance. Less 
emphasis is put on the analysis of the dynamics of innovation systems.” (Hekkert et al., 
2007:414). Instead, the “micro” level of analysis facilitates the study of innovation 
dynamics, overcoming these static frameworks by directing the analysis to specific 
“micro” technological fields or product technologies as in the Technological Specific 
Innovation Systems or Technical Innovation Systems approaches. Further, the study of 
dynamics of technological knowledge at the product level can benefit from the insights 
offered by one of the most important research traditions in Innovation Studies in the last 
three decades (Martin, 2012): Product Life-Cycle Theory (PLT).  
In this work we draw on insights from PLT to help us analyse the dynamic interaction 
between US regulation in medical devices and innovation in a Technological Specific 
Innovation System built around a medical product (hip prosthesis) developed originally 
in late 60’s. We will argue that US regulation is based on a crucial distinction between 
incremental and radical innovation, but does not consider that throughout the life cycle 
of a product such distinction does not remain fixed. We will suggest that in the hip 
prosthesis case this static regulatory division between radical and incremental 
innovation has led to recent attempts to engage in riskier, albeit incremental solutions, 
which ultimately failed. This outcome is somewhat paradoxical. Regulatory frameworks 
in medical devices were developed mainly to reduce the potential risks to patients of 
new technologies; they emerge as a governance tool to manage the uncertainties 
associated to new developments. Yet, we will show how the regulatory approach taken 
in the US has led to a specific form of technological change: incremental and, after a 
point, increasingly risky.  
Next section provides a theoretical grounding for our proposition that riskier 
incremental innovations could in fact characterize late stages in some Technological 
Specific Innovation Systems
3
. Our argument will be anchored in recent complexity 
thinking about Product Life-Cycle, and it will consider the regulatory framework as a 
crucial variable in the later stages of the cycle. Section Three will try to flesh out these 
                                                          
3
 We use the term Technological Specific Innovation System introduced by Hekkert et al. (2007) because 
it can encompass the specificity of technological knowledge at the product level.  The maybe more 
popular term of Technological Innovation Systems “usually refers to the notion of “Large Technological 
SystemsT (LTS)”, introduced by Hughes” (Hekkert et al., 2007: 416)  
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ideas in the context of the technological history of hip prosthesis, which in our 
interpretation have been influenced decisively by the current US Medical Device 
Regulation. The last section proposes, under the light of the hip prosthesis case, avenues 
for further theoretical and empirical research.  
2. Innovation Dynamics and Product Life Cycle Theory (PLT) 
Although the roots of PLT are based on research on market entry barriers (Mueller and 
Tilton, 1969) and international trade theory (Vernon, 1970), the canonical formulation 
of the theory is anchored in Innovation Management, as the seminal works of 
Abbernathy and Utterback (1975; 1978) were originally concerned about which kind of 
innovation (radical or incremental) would have more possibilities of success during the 
market life of a particular industrial product. In its most popular form, heavily 
influenced by evolutionary thinking, the theory distinguishes essentially two innovative 
stages in product life cycle. In the early phases of the development of a product most 
innovations are radical and generate great product variety, as there is a high uncertainty 
about the characteristics of the new technology. As the cycle advances, from this variety 
a “dominant design” is selected and improved incrementally until a new cycle of radical 
innovation begins (Figure 1 shows a representation in a classic article of Anderson and 
Tushman, 1990). The most commonly used example to illustrate the PLT is the early 
history of automobile (Clarck, 1985): while in 1900, at the beginning of its 
development, three radically different solutions were present in the market with a 
comparable share (electric, gasoline and steam engines), in 1920 the gasoline engine 
had been selected as the ‘dominant design’; since then, incremental innovations have 
been improving this dominant design. 
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Figure 1. Innovation in product life-cycle (Anderson and Tushman, 1990) 
 
Murmann and Frenken (2006:944) warned than when analyzing product life-cycles we 
must distinguish between the nature (incremental or radical) of technological change 
and the magnitude of social impact that such technological changes trigger. Probably 
due to its intellectual sources, anchored in Business Management, PLT studies have 
typically equated social impact with the competitive implications for firms of 
technological change (radical or incremental).
4
 Yet the social implications of product 
life-cycles go beyond firm dynamics and market exit and entry rates: importantly for the 
role of regulation in innovation, the changing relationship between radical and 
incremental innovation through a product life cycle affects the risk in the adoption of 
new products.     
The relationship between the type of technological change and the increase in risk is not 
direct and linear. First, in complex systems catastrophic events can be triggered by 
                                                          
4
 These competitive consequences refer usually to the exit and entry rates of firms during the life cycle: 
in the initial stages, new opportunities are reflected in a growing rate of entries, a small rate of exits and 
thus a rapid growth in the population of firms. When the dominant design appears, only a small number 
of firms can achieve economies of scale, setting high entry barriers, thus inducing a high number of exits 
and a small rate of entries, triggering a “industry shake-out”   (Gort and Klepper, 1982). Again, the classic 
example is the automobile industry: in 1920s, two decades after the beginning of the cycle, more than 
250 companies competed in the market; after the industry shake-out created by the emergence of the 
Ford T as “dominant design” and the economies of scale achieved by Fordist manufacturing techniques, 
less than 20 companies remained (Klepper, 1997). 
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small changes in one specific component -as in the O-ring failure of the Challenger 
shuttle catastrophe (Perrow, 1990; Reason, 1999)-. Similarly, literature on medical 
innovation (see Consoli and Mina, 2009, for a review) has showed that the relationship 
between body and technology is so complex
5
 that improvements in technology cannot 
be linearly related with risk reductions.    
Complexity theory has also used evolutionary arguments to build a dynamic 
understanding of the relationship between innovation and risk.  Borrowing from 
evolutionary biology the notion of “landscape”, some authors  (Dennet, 1994; Frenken, 
2006; Kaufmann, 1993) have proposed that incremental innovations can be conceived 
as local evolutionary searches
6
 in a landscape where the neighborhood topology is 
determined by the similarities of the related technologies and the heights of the 
landscape are the performance values of each technology (Figure 2);  performance 
values can be very different –creating a rugged landscape (Kaufmann, 1993)- even in 
the same technological neighborhood, as the interaction of different elements of the 
artifact could have huge effects in performance with even an incremental change in one 
of its elements (Frenken and Nuvolari, 2004). Following this logic, if we consider safety 
as one “service” dimension of technological performance (Lancaster, 1966; Frenken, 
2006), an incremental search on a local but rugged “safety” landscape can lead to a 
severe technological failure.  
This gives us already some clues about the possible dynamic relationships between 
innovation and risk regulation through a product life cycle. If a regulation is based on 
the assumption that the magnitude of technological change is directly and linearly 
related with increases in risk, it will place more burdensome regulatory requirements to 
radical innovations and less demanding ones to incremental innovations. This would  
creates incentives for innovators to explore the local landscape of technological 
possibilities (focus on incremental innovation), although, if this landscape is “rugged” 
small changes can generate considerable and negative effects on safety. Furthermore, as 
“leapfrogging” in the landscape in search of radical innovations (from A to B in Figure 
2) is penalized by regulation, technological discontinuities will become rarer and 
product life cycles will tend to be longer (Figure 1). The implication here is that  
                                                          
5
 Typical complex phenomena in this field are for example side effects emerging suddenly several years 
after the therapeutic act (Gelijins and Rosenberg, 1994). 
6
 Which are evolutionary in the sense that uncertainty is so pervasive in innovation that searches are 
partially “blind” (Campbell, 1960; Nelson and Winter, 1982). 
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innovators will continue its incremental search in the same local neighborhood, even in 
the most rugged and risky terrains (the valleys next to B in Figure 2, right). Thus, 
regulation can lead to “exhaustion” in the search for safe incremental innovations in late 
stages the life cycle: incremental search will continue even if it is around a “peak” of 
risk in the landscape. In the next section we will further explore this idea using the 
regulatory and technological history of hip prosthesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Left, a three dimensional landscape. Right, incremental and radical search in a 
two dimensional landscape. 
 
3. The Hip Prosthesis Case 
3.1 The US Medical Device Regulatory System 
We will begin with a broad review of the regulatory environment for hip prosthesis in 
US. Historically, the 1976 Medical Device Act is conceived as a delayed effect of the 
Thalomide disaster in 1961. Reacting to this disaster, in 1962 drug regulations were 
enforced, but the different nature of medical devices delayed until 1976 the approval of 
a comprehensive regulation of these technologies (Foote, 1992). Before 1976, US 
medical devices were not subjected to any premarket review (Anderson, 2006). 
The 1976 Medical Device Act introduced two different sets of regulatory requirements 
for innovations. When a device is classified as a radical innovation (i.e: not 
“substantially equivalent” to any pre-1976 device or to any post-1976 device already 
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approved for market use) it has to pass a premarket clinical testing process which can 
cost millions of dollars and take an average of four years to complete (Foote, 1992). 
However, if the device is considered an incremental innovation (“substantially 
equivalent” to already approved devices or to pre-1976 devices) it can be introduced 
into regular use without premarket clinical testing through the so called 510k process, 
where only laboratory trials with synthetic models are required. Manufacturers start the 
510k process claiming the similarity of their products to a specific “predicate device”  
(i.e., already approved devices or pre-1976 devices) and the Center for Devices and 
Radiological Health of the FDA decides whether to classify the new device as 
“substantially equivalent” to its predicate (IOM, 2011).7  
It has been claimed that this regulatory environment reduced notably the innovativeness 
of US medical devices industry and delayed the introduction of radical improvements in 
the US market (Miller, 2002), by making it more costly to achieve radical 
improvements in medical devices. An early study on 62 medical products and 26 firms 
in the sector seemed to confirm this claim (Hauptman and Roberts, 1987).  
The history of hip prosthesis development since 1970’s also seems to confirm this 
assertion. A growing literature has identified the development of new materials as a key 
source of innovation for medical devices (Barberá et al., 2011; Barberá and Consoli, 
2012; Morlacchi and Nelson, 2011; Mina et al., 2007; Consoli and Ramlogan, 2008). In 
the field of hip prosthesis, the introduction of bioceramics has been claimed as one of 
the most important innovations, as the friction of ceramic artificial articulations creates 
less wear debris than the traditional materials used in hip prosthesis, like metals and 
plastics (Anderson et al., 2006). Since the 1980’s, several ceramic prosthesis have been 
introduced into clinical use in Europe. In the US, however, these prosthesis were not 
                                                          
7
 Although the European environment is more complex, generally speaking there has not been any 
systematic requirement in Europe for premarket clinical testing for hip prosthesis innovations until 2009. 
Until 1998 each country had its own regulations, and many of the most important countries in hip 
prosthesis development (except France from 1992 to 1998) did not include any requirement for premarket 
clinical testing of new designs. From 1998, hip prostheses were classified as a Type II device in the 
unified European regulatory framework, a class of devices that did not require premarket tests (Faro and 
Huiskes, 1992; Chai, 2000). In 2009, hip prostheses were reclassified as a Type-III device requiring 
premarket clinical testing if the Notified Body in charge of the approval process considers it necessary.  
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susceptible to be approved without premarket testing (contrary to incremental 
innovations in metal and plastic prosthesis, considered as “substantially equivalent” to 
hip designs commercialized before 1976). It was not until 2005 that the first ceramic 
prosthesis was commercialized in the US, after fulfilling the premarket clinical testing 
requirements (Kurtz and Ong, 2009).  
3.2 Regulation and exhaustion of innovation. 
Now we can come back to the argument developed in section 2; there, we have argued 
that a burdensome regulatory framework imposed on radical innovations can exhaust 
the search of safe incremental innovations in late stages of a product life cycle. As 
radical changes are discouraged by onerous regulatory obligations, the technological 
discontinuity that could start a new cycle of “fresh” search of safe incremental 
innovations is delayed; instead, there is a continued search for incremental innovations 
in the late stages of the product cycle exhausting all possible avenues for safe 
incremental innovation, thus leading to the pursuit of riskier incremental changes.  
We argue that a recent failure in incremental innovation in hip prosthesis that had 
attracted media (Meier, 2011a,b,c; Meier, 2010) and institutional (IOM, 2011) attention 
could be interpreted as a signal of this safety exhaustion in incremental search. In 2005, 
a new prosthesis with bigger prosthetic femoral heads was classified as “substantially 
equivalent” to prior and smaller standard femoral heads for hip prosthesis. This small 
head standard size was established in the 70’s as an trade-off between the anatomical 
head size and the problems caused by wear debris in the artificial articulation; wear 
debris originated in the friction of the articulating components can migrate to the 
implant-bone interface and can cause an allergic reaction and implant loosening. This 
mechanism is the most common mode of failure in hip prosthesis. The chosen standard 
size was smaller than the anatomical femoral head, and thus had a higher risk of 
dislocation, as dislocation distance increases with the reduction of head size; at the same 
time, however, smaller head size causes fewer loosening failures since the head’s size is 
inversely correlated with the amount of debris generated by friction (Figure 3). Until the 
early 90s,  when wear debris was identified as the underlying mechanism behind many 
implant failures, the nature of the allergic mechanisms that cause implant loosening was 
not known (Kurtz, 2009; Anderson et al., 2006). 
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Figure 3. Less diameter of femoral head, bigger risk of dislocation (left). Less diameter 
of femoral head, lesser amount of debris generated by friction (right). 
 
In 2005 (about 35 years after the introduction in the market of hip prosthesis) a US 
company developed a new design with bigger prosthetic femoral heads: the rationale for 
the new bigger head design was based in improvements in manufacturing of existing 
metallic materials, which allegedly reduced wear debris in the artificial hip articulation 
even with larger head diameters (which have less risk of dislocation than the smaller 
standard head). The device was classified by the FDA as “substantially equivalent” to 
the prior smaller heads design (FDA, 2005).   
Apparently, this incremental improvement solved the trade-off between wear debris and 
dislocation risk. However, in 2010 (after 5 years of regular use), an important amount of 
early failures of the prosthesis caused by allergic reaction to debris were identified and 
the prosthesis was retired from the market in 2011 (Langton et al., 2010; Graves, 2011). 
It is estimated that the failure of the prosthesis will affect 30.000 patients, who will have 
to be re-operated (Meier, 2011a). 
The bigger head design was a step towards a solution to a persistently ill-understood 
problem -the allergic reaction provoked by wear debris- by means of an incremental 
innovation in the manufacturing of existing materials. The unintended and ill-
understood interaction between two presumably independent elements of the hip 
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prosthesis system (the artificial articulation where the wear debris is generated by 
friction and the bone-implant interface where the debris migrates and provokes the 
allergic reaction responsible for the loosening of the implant, Figure 3, right) caused 
that even an incremental change in the diameter of the head could have dramatic 
consequences in safety. Moreover, this risky incremental change happened in 2005, 
more than 35 years after the product cycle started with the original designs of hip 
prosthesis. Although we have seen that the US medical device regulation has probably 
influenced the delayed introduction in US of radical innovations like the use of  ceramic 
materials (which arrived to the US market also in 2005), this does not mean that 
research efforts were absent. A keyword search in PatStat database give us 683 US 
patents related to hip prosthesis technology for the 1976-2005 period (from the approval 
of the Medical Device Act to the failure of “bigger heads” incremental innovation). As 
the radical or incremental character of patents cannot be derived from available patent 
databases, we do not know the innovative degree of these patents. In any case, they 
confirm a continuous inventive activity during that period which may have led to an 
“exhaustion” of innovation in early years.  
4. Discussion  
Our brief account of the regulatory and technological history of hip prosthesis suggests 
that an incremental search in a highly uncertain and risky terrain could be an outcome of 
a search exhaustion at the late stage of product-life-cycles. Supported by theoretical 
work on the nature of risk landscapes and product life-cycels, we  interprete the failure 
of the “bigger heads” incremental  innovation after 35 years of extensive use of and 
continued research on hip prosthesis as a case of search exhaustion. Our story also 
suggests that  search exhaustion has been intensified by the US regulation in medical 
devices, which incentivizes incremental innovation regardless of the dynamic character 
of the product life-cycle.  
 
More generally, this chapter has highlighted the need for a dynamic perspective 
understanding of innovation knowledge when dealing with regulatory instruments of 
governance. In the hip prosthesis case, this regulatory instruments seemed to “guide the 
search” within the US medical devices Technology Specific Innovation System towards 
incremental improvements, under the implicit assumption that incremental rates of 
innovation linearly induce  incremental growth in risk. If incremental search exhaustion 
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is a general property of the late stages of product life cycles, governance of change in 
these late stages (Stegmaier et al., 2012) could benefit from the lessons of the hip 
prosthesis case. To fulfill their risk-reduction function, regulatory frameworks  
instruments need to acknowledge the dynamic character of technological change, and be 
adaptable to the different implications of incremental search strategies in different 
stages of a product life cycle. 
This opens a new set of research challenges. As Blind (2010: 238) put it, “a systematic 
analysis of the timing of regulation in the context of a whole innovation cycle is 
missing. Especially, the co-evolution of innovation and the regulatory framework has so 
far not been addressed”. Our interpretation of the relationship between the US medical 
device regulation and the innovation dynamics of hip prosthesis is a first step towards 
addressing this gap. Our research suggests that regulation, as a form of instrumentation 
of the governance of change, needs to adapt to the technological characteristics of such 
change. That product life cycles have a bearing on the adequacy of some governance 
instruments to steer technological change towards some pre-specific goals (here the 
reduction of risks for patients) implies that the evolution and outcomes of a governance 
system for technological change do not depend solely on socio-political factors 
(structure and capability of the agents, legitimacy issues and learning processes) but 
also on the technological characteristics of the product families subjected to regulation.  
Our analysis has focused on the “instrumental pillar” of governance. The case we have 
presented also has implications for the other “pillars” in the governance of change 
identified by Borrás and Edler (2012). Yet, the problems with prosthetic hip designs we 
have presented here are relatively recent and it is yet too early to assess how the role 
that the other pillars in the governance of change will come to play. For instance, the 
technological failures we have referred to are likely to have an effect on the legitimacy 
of governance structure; patients and institutions as the Institute of Medicine (a part of 
the US National Academy of Science) are questioning the regulatory systems that have 
so clearly failed to fulfill the objective of increasing safety and reducing risk. Yet, the 
way in which this legitimacy crisis will play up remains uncertain, as the industry had 
waged since the beginning of the crisis an aggressive campaign to discredit the report of 
the Institute of Medicine, which asked for stricter regulation (Meier, 2011a). The way 
the regulatory framework will be able to acquire legitimacy depends on the learning 
processes, but the lessons that the publics will draw from the events we have described 
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and analyzed are not predetermined. There will be argument and debate and the 
regulatory policy that will emerge as more legitimate is not predetermined by the 
technological developments and the ensuing legitimacy crisis we are presenting here. 
The different pillars have their own dynamics and it is too early, in our case, to identify 
how the interactions among them will develop. We are still in the early phases of what 
we expect will be a crisis of legitimacy and an uncertain process of “learning” triggered 
by a problem generated by the way in which technological change occurs under a 
particular regulatory instrument. It is important to note, however, that an important 
element that emerges in the process of technological change we have described occurs 
because of a “given logic, which is not culturally or socially determined” (Bimber,1994: 
84). In the “technological landscape” metaphor we have used, the “logic” of the 
“rugged” neighborhoods is created by the critical relationship between the size of the 
artificial hip prosthesis head and wear debris production. This is a purely technological 
relationship which is crucial to explain late failures of hip prosthesis. The way in which 
society will steer technological change to respond to this challenge will depend on the 
forms of learning and the types of regulation that will acquire legitimacy on the 
aftermath of a regulatory crisis. In our account, organizations and individuals create 
regulations using dubious assumptions about the relationship between innovation, risk 
and time; yet these assumptions may be persistent. Other kind of organizations and 
individuals have creatively followed the incentives posed by those regulations, 
discovering new incremental innovations until this form of search for innovations have 
become exhausted because of the technological characteristics of the landscape we have 
described. It is in the analysis of the social response to this crisis that the remaining 
“pillars” of technological change governance will come to play a role, which is so far 
unpredictable.  
We have shown how such unpredictability has so far been rooted on scientific 
uncertainty about the mechanisms underlying the deleterious effect of wear debris. In 
our interpretation, this uncertainty made innovators unable to predict how riskily 
“rugged” was the technological landscape they were exploring. Notably, the risky 
explorations of the size-wear debris relationships happened late in the product-life 
cycle: it was only after various decades of prolonged search in other (and apparently 
characterized by less intense uncertainty) locations when innovators decided also to 
explore new designs with bigger heads. Although this exploration did only imply size 
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variation, this incremental change drove the innovative agents to uncertain terrains 
which ultimately resulted to be intolerable risky. How public policy and, with it, 
technological change will respond to this problem is also unpredictable, not because of 
technological uncertainty, but because of the uncertain outcome of complex policy 
processes in which different policy stakeholders may draw different lessons from their 
experiences and propose different regulatory and technological solutions. 
From our point of view, and from a more normative perspective, we would argue that 
our research suggests that safety regulations for incremental innovation may need to 
become more restrictive towards the end of a product life cycle. This recommendation 
is, of course, exceedingly difficult to implement in practice and is unlikely to be 
universally shared. In medical devices regulation terms, it could mean that the 
premarket clinical trials should be applied to every innovation (incremental or radical) 
and lighter regulatory frameworks -without premarket trials- should only be applicable, 
if at all, to incremental innovations in the mid-part of the product life cycle, when local 
search has not still exhausted safer incremental improvements. Normatively, such 
decisions call for a highly reflective system of governance: there is a need for 
continuous monitoring and learning, as the implications of technological change for the 
governance systems of such change are constantly changing with the levels of product 
maturity. 
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